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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to examine unemployment persistence in Spain by the so-called “ladder” 
effect.  This arises when highly-skilled workers who do not find a job matching their skills 
accept jobs which previously were occupied by less qualified staff.  We develop a dynamic 
general equilibrium model, in which two types of workers – characterised by their level of 
formal education – coexist on the labour market.  Highly educated workers are then assumed to 
compete with low-skilled workers, generating a ladder effect.  The model is then calibrated on 
the Spanish economy.  Our results replicate the observed decline in the ratio of high- to low-
skilled vacancies, and explains how firms substitute high- for low-skilled employment.  The 
results also suggest that the Spanish ladder effect may reflect increases in the training costs as a 
result of a biased-shock against low-skilled workers. 
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1 Introduction
During the two last decades, there has been a reduction in the demand for low–skilled
workers relative to highly–skilled in many industrialised countries (see OECD, (1994)).
This phenomenon is usually accompanied by a deterioration of economic conditions of
low–skilled workers. In Europe, this problem has manifested itself in a larger increase in
the unemployment rate together with a longer duration of unemployment for low–skilled
workers relative to highly–skilled (Drèze and Sneessens, (1997)). In the US and UK,
this phenomenon has been associated with greater wage inequality across skill groups
(see Krugman, (1994)). Meanwhile, many workers have attained higher levels of educa-
tion. This latter phenomenon has led to a structural change in the composition of the
labour force, which has essentially taken place for new entrants in the labour market (see
Robinson and Manacorda, (1997)).
The large increases in low-skilled unemployment rates in the EU countries may be ex-
plained in di¤erent ways. One standard explanation is “skill mismatch” resulting from rel-
ative wage rigidities in the face of biased technological shock. Another explanation arises
from job competition between highly and low-skilled workers: by applying to low-skilled
jobs, highly skilled workers manage to increase their probability to get a job displac-
ing low-skilled ones- the so-called “ladder e¤ect”. Firms may wish to hire highly skilled
workers for low-skilled jobs, for instance, to avoid training cost (see Thurow (1975)), or
because they have a high productivity (see Gautier (1999)). The fact that highly skilled
workers may occupy low-skilled positions has been documented in several countries (see
Van Ours and Ridder (1995), and Muysken and Ter Weel (1998), for the Netherlands,
and Green et al. (1999), for the UK).
This explanation is particularly relevant for Spain where the proportion of educated
workers has sharply increased after 1980 (see García Montalvo (1995), and Blanco (1997)).
Speci…cally it increases more from middle of the 1980’s than before. For instance, EPA
(Spanish Labour Population Survey) data shows that in 1988 only 17.3% of the labour
force attained upper–secondary schooling and 28.4% in 1996.1 In Table 1, we categorise
employment and unemployment rates into educational and occupational categories. The
Table shows that the ratio of the highly to low–skilled labour force averages about 30%
and that it rose considerably during the period 1988-1996. At the same time, the un-
employment rate of the low–skilled workers rose too. For instance, illiterate workers and
those with primary and low-secondary schooling have experienced a marked increase in
unemployment rates (from 19% in 1988 up to 23% in 1996). In the same period, the
proportion of low-skilled jobs …lled by highly skilled workers rose from 9.8% in 1988 to
15.1% in 1996.2
Alba-Ramirez (1993), …nds that Spanish highly skilled workers on low-skilled jobs are
mainly young skilled workers, without experience, who need a …rst job in order to obtain
on-the-job training. After some time, they become the main job turnover group, which
1More information ab out composition of the lab our force by education in app endix B.
2We have analysed these proportions for the whole of the economy. Although the ladder e¤ect is
relevant in all groups of workers, it seems to have a stronger importance in women and young workers
than in among older men.
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implies they move into jobs that require higher educational levels than their original ones.
García-Serrano and Malo (1995), analyse the substitutability between education and on-
the-job training. They conclude that Spanish …rms hire highly skilled workers to reduce
investment in speci…c human capital formation. Beneito et al. (1996), also conclude that
in Spain education is a substitute for on-the-job training, and suggest that this fact is a
source of ine¢ciency in the allocation of resources by generating ‘overeducation’.3
The aim of this paper is to examine to what extent a ladder e¤ect may contribute
to explain changes in the unemployment rate and unemployment di¤erences across skill
groups in Spain. To this aim, we develop an intertemporal general equilibrium model
with two types of workers (highly and low-skilled)) and two types of jobs. We distinguish
two kinds of shocks: (i) a demand shock and (ii) a general training cost. The second
shock can be interpreted as a skill-biased technological shock against low-skilled workers
as well as a supply shock. Production technology is such that highly skilled jobs can
be …lled only by educated workers, while low–skilled jobs may be …lled by both types
of workers. Following Pissarides (2000), we assume that trade in the labour market is
represented by a matching process with a Nash wage bargain. There are three matching
functions 4 for each sort of employment. Highly skilled workers look for highly skilled
jobs, but if they do not …nd them, they look for low-skilled jobs as a temporary stop gap.
We …nd that the “ladder e¤ect” increases after each shock. However, employment and
vacancies variables have not the same importance and evolution facing each shock. The
model can replicate the observed decline in the ratio of highly to low–skilled vacancy rates.
This decline is best explained by a decrease in both types of vacancies, as produced by a
training cost change. Moreover, the evolution of the decrease in low-skilled employment
is better reproduced by introducing training cost changes than highly skilled labour force
changes.
The second section presents the model, showing the speci…c circumstances that gen-
erate a ladder e¤ect. The third section describes the data and our calibration procedure.
The forth section analyses the response of some key variables to (i) the introduction of a
training cost for low-skilled workers and (ii) an increase in the relative size of the highly
skilled labour force. We evaluate the implications of these shocks on the model steady
state, thereby enabling us to perform comparative static exercises. We study transitional
dynamics. The last section o¤ers some concluding remarks.
3These studies use di¤erent data surveys and estimation methods.
4Dolado et al. (2000), build a matching model closely related to our approach. Their results focus
on the youth overeducation in Spain. Their model exogenously set the wages mechanism whereas our
model sets wages in a Nash bargaining process. This is important in terms of posting vacancies and in
the evolution of endogenous probabilities.
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2 A model of the ladder e¤ect
2.1 Trade in the labour market
We consider an economy with of two types of workers: highly skilled and low–skilled.
Highly skilled workers can perform low–skilled jobs, whereas low–skilled workers are un-
productive in highly skilled jobs. In each period there are Lh highly skilled workers and
Ll low–skilled workers. Lh and Ll are exogenous. Because …rms observe the workers’ skill
level, low–skilled workers can only apply to low–skilled jobs. Highly skilled workers can
apply to both types of jobs. This creates an asymmetry among workers pertaining to
the competition between highly and low–skilled workers on the low–skilled job markets,
which is the source of the ladder e¤ect. Although there are no di¤erences in terms of
productivity between highly and low-skilled workers when working on a low–skilled job,
…rms can incur into a general training cost whenever they hire low–skilled workers.
All variables V ¿j;t, U
¿
j;t, N
¿
j;t and H
¿
j;t where j; ¿ 2 fh; lg are ratios divided by their
corresponding labour force. Let Nhh;t denote the proportion of highly skilled workers
working as highly skilled, Nhl;t denote the proportion of highly skilled workers working as
low-skilled, and Uht denote the highly skilled unemployment rate. We have
Nhh;t +N
h
l;t + U
h
t = 1:
Likewise, denote N lt and U
l
t the proportion of low–skilled working and unemployed. We
have
N lt + U
l
t = 1:
Following Pissarides (2000), we assume that trade in the labour market is an uncoordi-
nated and costly activity. Whenever a …rm posts vacancies only a fraction of each of them
will be …lled – V hj;t and V
l
j;t vacancies rate highly skilled and low-skilled jobs respectively.
We take a constant returns to scale the Cobb-Douglas matching function relating the
number of matches to the number of vacancies and the number of job seekers.
We assume that high-skilled workers. This group can …ll highly skilled jobs or low-
skilled jobs. And low-skill educated workers can …ll only the rest of low-jobs not …lled by
highly skilled workers.
We distinguish two matching functions to …ll low-skilled jobs: workers with more
education take …rst low-skilled vacancies. We assume that the e¢ciency matching factors
of highly skilled workers will be larger than the e¢ciency matching factor of low-skilled
workers.
Let us now be more precise on the timing of events, and …rst consider highly skilled
workers. A given highly skilled worker …rst looks for a highly skilled job, such that
Hhh;t ´ Hhh
¡
V ht ; U
h
t +N
h
l;t
¢
are formed in period t. Implicit in this formulation is the fact
that job seekers are composed of highly skilled workers who do not work in highly skilled
jobs in period t.
When the highly skilled job seeker does not match with a …rm in period t, she goes
on the low–skilled labour market and attempts to get a match as a low–skilled worker.
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Then,Hhl;t ´ Hhl
¡
V lt L
l=Lh; 1¡Nhh;t+1
¢
are formed on this market. The level of low–skilled
vacancies posted by …rms has to be adjusted for the relative size of the two populations,
in order to preserve the absence of size e¤ects in the matching process.
Finally, low–skilled workers can be employed on a low–skilled job — not already
occupied by highly skilled workers — such that the level of hirings for the low–skilled is
H lt ´ H l
¡
V lt ¡Hhl;tLh=Ll; U lt
¢
, where only those vacancies not …lled by the highly skilled
workers remain available to the low–skilled workers. Like the previous case, the ratio
Lh=Ll adjusts for the di¤erent sizes of each group.
It is worth noting that, as in Pissarides (2000), each matching function only depends
on aggregate quantities, thus re‡ecting the fact that …rms and job seekers have no control
on the matching process. This assumption re‡ects the existence of the traditional positive
trade externalities and congestion e¤ects, associated with the matching process. The
evolution of the level of each type of employment is therefore given by:
Nhh;t+1 = H
h
h;t + (1¡ s)Nhh;t (1)
Nhl;t+1 = H
h
l;t (2)
N lt+1 = H
l
t + (1¡ ¹)N lt (3)
where s; ¹ 2 (0; 1) denote the constant exogenous separation rates for each type of em-
ployment. The second law of motion (equation (2)) represents the fact that highly skilled
workers do not occupy a low–skilled job for more than one period, but rather go back on
the search. We can interpret it as a temporary job for highly skilled workers, which is
consistent with the high turnover rate for this group of workers. Since 1984, in Spain one
third of the level of unemployment comes from temporary jobs.5
phh;t is the probability that a highly skilled unemployed worker will be employed in
a highly skilled job in the next period; phl;t is the probability that a highly skilled un-
employed worker will be employed in a low-skilled job; and plt is the probability that a
low-skilled unemployed worker will be employed in a low-skilled job in the next period.
Thus:
phh;t =
Hhh;t
Uht +N
h
l;t
, phl;t =
Hhl;t
1¡Hhh;t ¡ (1¡ s)Nhh;t
and plt =
H lt
U lt
: (4)
In Figure (1) we can observe ‡ows in and out of employment. Below we express the
unemployment dynamic to explain the evolution in both labour markets:
Uht+1 = 1¡Hhh;t ¡Hhl;t ¡ (1¡ s)Nhh;t
U lt+1 = 1¡H lt ¡ (1¡ ¹)N lt :
5We have checked that the total destruction rate is consistent with our calibration of separation rate
of highly skilled workers in a low-skilled job. For more details see Section 3.2.
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2.2 Firms
The economy is comprised of a continuum of …rms with measure one. In each period, a
…rm j has access to a constant returns to scale technology represented by the following
production function:
Yj;t = AK
®
j;t(L
hNhh;j;t)
µ
¡
LhNhl;j;t + L
lN lj;t
¢1¡®¡µ
(5)
where Kj;t, Nhh;j;t, N
h
l;j;t and N
l
j;t respectively denote the level of physical capital, the
highly–skilled employment rate, and the low–skilled employment rate respectively occu-
pied by high and low skilled workers. We suppose there is perfect substitution in terms
of productivity between low-skilled workers and highly-skilled workers in order to …ll a
low-skilled job. The value of A is a positive constant that represents the level of total
factor productivity. Finally, ®; µ 2 (0; 1) respectively denote the elasticity of output with
regards to physical capital and highly–skilled employment.
Each period, the …rm invests a level Ij;t to form capital that standardly accumulates
as:
Kj;t+1 = Ij;t + (1¡ ±)Kj;t (6)
where ± 2 (0; 1) is the constant depreciation rate. It also posts vacancies. V hj;t and V lj;t
are vacancies rates for respectively high and low–skilled jobs, and the …rm incurs a linear
cost !h and !l per posted vacancy. These vacancies determine the employment that will
be used in the following period. The law of motion of each type of employment are given
by:
Nhh;j;t+1 = q
h
h;tV
h
j;t + (1¡ s)Nhh;j;t (7)
Nhl;j;t+1 = q
h
l;tV
l
j;t
Ll
Lh
(8)
N lj;t+1 = q
l
t
¡
1¡ qhl;t
¢
V lj;t + (1¡ ¹)N lj;t (9)
where qhh;t; is the probability of …lling highly–skilled vacancies, q
h
l;t; is the probability of
…lling a low–skilled vacancy with a highly–skilled worker and qlt, is the probability of
…lling a low–skilled vacancy with a low–skilled worker. These probabilities are thus given
by
qhh;t =
Hhh;t
V ht
, qhl;t =
Hhl;t
V lt
Lh
Ll
and qlt =
H lt
V lt ¡Hhl;tLh=Ll
: (10)
It is worth noting that these probabilities are determined by aggregate quantities and
thus re‡ect the trade externalities implied by the search process. whh;t; w
h
l;t and w
l
t are
the bargained wages. And …nally, when hiring a low–skilled worker, the …rm has to train
her and therefore incurs a proportional cost { per hiring. We suppose that a low-skilled
worker needs training when she is hired in a new …rm, (i.e. it can lead to a change in
technology). We also suppose that a highly-skilled worker has an exogenous general skill
from her education, which avoids this training cost.
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The period t instantaneous pro…t can be expressed as6
¦j;t = Yj;t ¡ whh;tNhh;j;tLh ¡ whl;tNhl;j;tLh ¡ wltN lj;tLl (11)
¡Ij;t ¡ !hV hj;tLh ¡ !lV lj;tLl ¡ {H ltLl
Each …rm j determines its factor demand and investment plan— both on the good
and the labour market — maximising its market value:7
¨(SFj;0) =
1X
t=0
Rt¦j;t
subject to (5)–(11) where ¨(SFj;0) denotes the value of …rm Rt =
Qt
¿=0(1 + r¿ )
¡1 and
rt is the real interest rate. Finally, the set of each …rm’s state variables is SFj;t =©
Kj;t;N
h
h;j;t;N
h
l;j;t;N
l
j;t
ª
. Hereafter Xkj;t, X
h
h;j;t, X
h
l;j;t and X
l
j;t will denote the Lagrange
multipliers associated to the capital and employment laws of motion respectively. The
…rst order conditions associated with the control variables investment, Ij;t and vacancies,
V hj;t and V
l
j;t; are given by
Xkj;t = 1 (12)
qhh;tX
h
h;j;t = !h (13)
qhl;tX
h
l;j;t + q
l
t(1¡ qhl;t)X lj;t = !l + {qlt(1¡ qhl;t): (14)
Equation (12) represents the optimal level of investment, the marginal cost of capital
goods for the …rm that is one. Equation (13) represents the optimal level of highly–skilled
vacancies posted by a …rm. It states that the …rm will post highly–skilled vacancies up
to the point where the expected marginal value of …lling an additional highly–skilled
job (qhh;tX
h
h;j;t), is just compensated by the marginal cost to post a highly–skilled vacancy
(!h). The …rst order condition (14), the marginal value for the …rm to …ll a low-skilled job
receives a similar interpretation, up to the point the marginal cost of posting a vacancy
is complemented by an additional cost of training to hire a low-skilled worker. If we
suppose no training cost { then qhl;tXhl;j;t + qlt(1¡ qhl;t)X lj;t = !l. A part of the left side is
the expected marginal value corresponding to …ll the vacancy with a highly-skilled worker
and the other part the expected marginal value corresponding to …ll the vacancy with a
low-skilled worker. Both depending on their di¤erent probabilities to …ll this vacancy.
The parameters will be chosen in a such a way that the …rm prefers highly–skilled
workers to low–skilled ones to …ll a low-skilled vacancy8:
Xhl;j;t > X lj;t: (15)
6After rearranging, {HltLl = {qltV lt Ll ¡ {qltHhl;tLh = {qlt(1 ¡ qhl;t)V lt Ll.
7The interested reader is lead to Appendix A.1 for the optimality conditions associated to the …rm’s
problem.
8We have checked that assumption 15 is validated ex-post.
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2.3 Households
We now present the behaviour of each type of household — highly–skilled and low–skilled,
indexed by i. Following Andolfatto (1996), households of the same type are assumed to
be identical ex ante. The random matchings and separations in the labour market induce
di¤erent states in the labour market which can lead to ex post heterogenous wealth
positions, which would then make the problem intractable as we would have to keep
track of each individual story. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there exists
a perfect insurance market, which allows risk averse households to fully insure against
the di¤erent income ‡uctuations and labour market transitions. We assume that the
labour force is randomly assigned across jobs at the beginning of each period. Thus, the
representative household assumption can be made and the probability of employment
status in any period is given by the di¤erent proportions of the employment status. A
detailed description of the household problem with full insurance is provided in Appendix
A.2.
2.3.1 Low–skilled households
In each period, a low–skilled household i can be in two alternative states in the labour
market — either employed with probability N lt or unemployed with probability U
l
t =
1 ¡ N lt . Depending on the state, the instantaneous utility function of the low–skilled
household i is given by:
uli;t = log(C
l
i;t ¡ ¡l) if employed
ul
?
i;t = log(C
l?
i;t ¡ ¡l¤) if unemployed
where C li;t and C
l¤
i;t respectively denote the level of consumption of an employed and
unemployed low–skilled household. ¡l and ¡l
¤
represent a utility cost — expressed in
terms of physical goods — associated with the state in the labour market. This cost is
assumed to be constant over the business cycle.
The household enters the period with a level of assets Bli;t carried over from the
previous period, from which she gets interest revenues. When employed, the household
receives the real wage, wlijt, bargained with the …rm. When unemployed, she receives an
unemployment insurance, associated with the insurance contract signed with an insurance
company.9 These revenues are then used to consume C li;t and C
l?
i;t with probabilities N
l
t
and 1¡N lt , and to buy new assets. Therefore, the consolidated budget constraint after
the insurance contract faced by the low–skilled household10 is
N ltC
l
i;t + (1¡N lt)C l
?
i;t +B
l
i;t+1  N ltwlijt + (1 + rt)Bli;t (16)
Let the probability of being employed beN lt . The problem of the representative house-
hold i is therefore to maximise the expectation of the discounted sum of its instantaneous
9Appendix A.2 proves that households will choose to be fully insured against the risk of unemployment.
10Implicit in this formulation is that the insurance problem has already been solved.
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utility with respect to the consumption and the assets she holds:
1X
t=0
¯t
©
N ltu
l
i;t + (1¡N lt)ul
?
i;t
ª
subject to equation (16).
2.3.2 Highly–skilled households
Like low–skilled households, a highly–skilled household faces di¤erent states in the labour
market. She can be either employed as a highly–skilled worker with probability Nhh;t,
employed as a low–skilled worker with probability Nhl;t, or unemployed with probability
Uht = 1¡Nhh;t¡Nhl;t. For each state, the instantaneous utility function of the highly–skilled
household i is given by:
uhh;i;t = log(C
h
h;i;t ¡ ¡h) if employed as high–skilled
uhl;i;t = log(C
h
l;i;t ¡ ¡hl ) if employed as low–skilled
uh
?
i;t = log(C
h?
i;t ¡ ¡h¤) if unemployed
where Chh;i;t; C
h
l;i;t and C
h¤
i;t respectively denote the employed household’s consumption
when she works as a highly–skilled or low–skilled worker and her consumption when
unemployed. ¡h represents a cost, in terms of physical goods, associated with the highly–
skilled working activity. ¡hl and ¡
h¤ are the same costs previously de…ned for low-skilled
households. These costs are assumed to be constant over the business cycle.
The consolidated budget constraint after the insurance contract faced by the highly–
skilled worker is similar to that faced by the low–skilled. Now however, the household
may be in three alternative states
Nhh;tC
h
h;i;t +N
h
l;tC
h
l;i;t + U
h
t C
h?
i;t + B
h
i;t+1  (17)
 Nhh;twhh;ijt +Nhl;twhl;ijt + (1 + rt)Bhi;t:
The highly–skilled worker solves the same problem as the low–skilled worker. She
maximises the discounted sum of its instantaneous utility with respect to consumption
and the assets she holds:
1X
t=0
¯t
©
Nhh;tu
h
h;i;t +N
h
l;tu
h
l;i;t + U
h
t u
h?
i;t
ª
subject to equation (17).
2.4 Wage determination
Following Pissarides (2000), we assume that wages are determined by a Nash bargaining
process between the …rm and the household. The rent is shared according to the Nash
9
solution of the bargaining problem. Because of the coexistence of di¤erent types of
workers, there are di¤erent wage bargaining processes which give rise to di¤erent levels
of wages. At the beginning of every period; there is a re-negotiation between …rms and
workers.
Let »hh, »
l
h and »
l denote the exogenous parameters, which measure the bargaining
power of highly–skilled households applying for highly–skilled and low–skilled jobs and
low–skilled workers, the level of wages in a symmetric equilibrium can be shown to be:11.
whht = »
h
h
µ
µ
Yt
LhNhht
+ phhtX
h
ht
¶
+ (18)
+(1¡ »hh)
µ
¡h +
Nhlt
1¡Nhht
(whlt ¡ ¡l)
¶
whlt = »
h
l
Ã
(1¡ ®¡ µ) Yjt
LhNhl;jt + L
lN ljt
!
+ (1¡ »hh)¡l (19)
wlt = »
l
Ã
(1¡ ®¡ µ) Yjt
LhNhl;jt + L
lN ljt
+ pltX
l
t
!
+ (1¡ »l)¡l (20)
which just amounts to the standard total rent sharing rule between the participant of
the bargaining process. The …rm acquires the gain in marginal labour productivity and
the expected marginal value of a newly created job, Xhh;t and X
l
t : When a highly-skilled
worker is in a low-skilled vacancy, the separation rate is 1, and the gain for the …rm is
only the marginal labour productivity. The share accrued by the worker is given by the
di¤erential in the disutility of work. It is worth noting that for the highly-skilled worker,
who …lls a highly-skilled vacancy takes into account the disutililty of work and of working
in a low-skilled vacancy.12
2.5 Equilibrium
A perfect foresight equilibrium of this economy is a sequence of prices fPtg1t=0 = fwhh;t; whl;t;
wlt; rtg1t=0 and a sequence of quantities fQtg1t=0 = ffQHt g1t=0; fQFt g1t=0g. fQHt g1t=0 =
fChh;t; Chl;t; C lt ; Bht ; Bltg1t=0 and fQFt g1t=0 = fYt; It; Kt; Nhh;t; Nhl;t; N lt ; V ht ; V lt g1t=0 such that:
(i) given a sequence of prices fPtg1t=0, fQHt g1t=0 is a solution to the representative
household’s problem;
(ii) given a sequence of prices fPtg1t=0, fQFt g1t=0 is a solution to the representative …rm’s
problem;
(iii) given a sequence of quantities fQtg1t=0, fPtg1t=0 clears the goods markets in the
sense
Yt = Ct + It + !hV
h
t L
h + !lV
l
t L
l + {H ltV lt
11See appendix A.3 for a detailed exposition of the bargaining process
12Notice as well that ¡l
¤
= ¡h
¤
= 0 and ¡l = ¡hl :
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and the capital markets.
(iv) wages are set according to the rent sharing mechanism.
(v) labour market ‡ows are determined by hiring functions, Hhh;t; H
h
l;t and H
l
t :
3 Data and calibration
We are now to analyse the response of some key variables following two alternative types
of shocks: a labour demand and a labour supply shock, which will be embodied in changes
in the training cost, {, and the highly–skilled labour force.
Since the model does not admit any analytical solution, We rely on numerical simu-
lations of the model. This is achieved using the software dynare developed by Juillard
(1996)13. This implies that numerical values have to be assigned parameters. Such val-
ues are obtained from the Spanish economy. Before proceeding to the calibration, We
describe the data we will rely on.
3.1 The data
The model is calibrated on the Spanish economy using quarterly data. Macroeconomic
time series are borrowed from Puch and Licandro (1997), who elaborated on the National
Accounts of the Spanish Economy (Contabilidad Nacional de España). Aggregate con-
sumption is given by the sum of non-durable consumption and government expenditures,
and investment is the sum of durable consumption and …xed investment.
In order to obtain data consistent with the measure of the “ladder e¤ect” problem, we
rely on the Linked Labour Population Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa enlazada,
EPA hereafter). This quarterly survey collects panel data of individuals during six con-
secutive quarters periods. The sample runs from 1987:1 to 1996:4. It covers a large
number of individuals and characteristics, such as formal education attainment, occupa-
tion, employment status, age and gender. It de…nes 5 groups of education and 10 groups
of occupation (range 0–9). High–skilled individuals are de…ned, for our purpose, as those
with a level of education greater or equal to upper-secondary education. Therefore, low–
skilled individuals essentially consist of illiterate and uneducated persons, primary or
low–secondary educated people. Highly–skilled occupations are taken to be managers,
professionals and technicians and support professionals (range 1–3 in EPA classi…cation),
the rest (range 0,4–9 in EPA are armed forces, clerks, service, skilled agricultural/…shing,
Craft-Transport, Plant-Manufacture and unskilled group) is taken to de…ne low–skilled
occupations.14. Ratios are reported in Table 2.
13More about dynare and the underlying relaxation algorithm can be found in La¤argue (1990) and
Boucekkine (1995).
14More detailed employment data in Appendix B.
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The “ladder e¤ect” problem is measured as the percentage of highly educated people
who occupy a job with low–skilled requisites (Nhl in our model). Finally, those highly-
educated workers in a highly–skilled occupation and those low educated workers in a
low–skilled occupation are represented as Nhh and N
l
l , respectively. The highly–skilled
(low–skilled) population, Lh (Ll), is given by the sum of highly (low) educated employed
and unemployed individuals.
Table 2 reports the probability of …nding a job for each type of worker. For our
estimations and stylised facts we have used the de…nitions of education and occupation
in the linked EPA survey.15 For instance, phh (or p
l
h) — the probability that a highly
skilled unemployed worker …nds a highly skilled (or a low–skilled job) — is measured as
the proportion of highly educated unemployed workers who …nd a highly skilled (low–
skilled) job from one period to the other. Likewise, the probability that a low–skilled
unemployed …nds a (low–skilled) job, pl is measured as the proportion of low–skilled
unemployed who are employed in a (low–skilled) occupation from one period to other,
corrected by total population.
Vacancies are measured by the number of vacancies not …lled at the end of period as
reported by the National Employment O¢ce (INEM). These data also range from 1987:1
to 1996:4 and are categorised in terms of occupations following the same de…nition as
EPA data for employment.16 They are taken in terms of proportion of the high-skilled
or low-skilled total population.
3.2 Calibration
Table 3 reports the calibrated value of behavioural parameters. These values are obtained
from the model to their empirical counterpart. For instance, the di¤erent elasticities of
output are set in steady state to be a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas. The
discount rate, ¯, is set such that, using the Euler equation associated to the capital
accumulation decision, the model matches a capital/output ratio of 9.8 — obtained from
Spanish Quarterly data. Likewise, the depreciation rate, ±, is 0.0292.
Cost of vacancies !l and !h are set in steady state. We suppose that the cost of being
unemployment is ¡h
¤
= ¡l
¤
= 0: We also suppose that the cost of working in a low-skilled
job is the same for both high and low skilled worker. Those together with the cost of
working as highly-skilled worked in a highly-skilled job ¡h are set in steady state. It is
supposed that ¡h > ¡hl = ¡
l > ¡h
¤
= ¡l
¤
:
Training costs are set to zero in our benchmark case, but a sensitivity analysis to
changes in this parameter will also be considered. The total factor productivity is set
such that, in steady state, output is equal to 1.
°, the elasticity of the matching process with regards to the number of vacancies is
assumed to be the same in each function and is set to ° = 0:5, which lies within the
range of estimated values for the Spanish economy. The bargaining power of households
15The proportions and probabilities data are that we have used to solve the model (except to phl;t value
set in steady state, see calibration section).
16National de…nitions according with R.D. 2240/79 from 14 of August. Using by INEM and EPA.
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(f»jigi;j2fh;lg) is also set to 0.5, such that it is equal to the elasticity of matching with
respect to vacancies. We therefore recover the so–called Hosios’ condition.
First of all, the three matching functions are speci…ed as
Hhh;t = H
h
h(V
h
h;t)
°(1¡Nhh;t)1¡°
Hhl;t = H
h
l
µ
V hh;t
Ll
Lh
¶°
(1¡Nhh;t+1)1¡°
H lt = H
l
µ
V lt ¡
Lh
Ll
Hhl;t
¶°
(1¡N lt)1¡°:
In the steady state, we set Hhl;t = N
h
l;t: Given probabilities of …nding a job, and the level
of the employment rates, we are able to compute the average number of hirings as
Hhh = p
h
h(1¡Nhh ), and and H l = pl(1¡N l):
In order to solve the model, we get the value of phl at steady state using the probability of
…nding a low-skilled job by a highly skilled workers phl;t =
Hhl;t
1¡Hhh;t¡(1¡s)Nhh;t
. These numbers
can then be used to calibrate H
h
h, H
h
l and H
l
in steady state respectively. As we have
remarked in the description of the model, we suppose that …rms prefer to hire a highly-
skilled worker in a low-skilled job, that is the e¢ciency factor of the matching function
H
h
l is higher than the other parameters and its in‡uence can be seen in that their wages
become more competitive.
The exogenous quit rates are calibrated using equations (7)–(10) evaluated in steady
state. Therefore, we obtain
s =
Hhh
Nhh
and ¹ =
H l
N l
.
The separation rate for highly skilled workers in a highly skilled job s, is larger than
the separation rate for low-skilled workers, ¹. This is consistent as a high turnover rate
in the skilled workers. We set the separation rate for highly skilled workers in a low-
skilled job to the value of one. In our economy, the total destruction is about 11%. This
is consistent with the average of destruction rate for Spanish …rms in Díaz-Moreno and
Galdón (2000).17
Skilled and unskilled vacancies, V h and V l, are de…ned as the sum of high and low–
skilled hirings and un…lled high and low–skilled vacancies. This permits obtaining the
probability that a …rm …lls a highly–skilled vacancy with a highly–skilled worker, qhh and
the probability of …lling a low–skilled vacancy with a high or low–skilled worker, qhl and
ql, as de…ned in equation (10). Wage variables are set in steady state. Notice that highly-
skilled wages are highest. And slightly low-skilled wages larger that highly-skilled wages
when the worker is highly-educated in a low-skilled job. These numbers are reported in
Table 4.
17They estimate quaterly job ‡ows for Spanish economy for the period 93:II to 95:I.
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4 Analysis of results
This section proposes an analysis of the response of some key variables characteristic of
the labour market to exogenous permanent shocks to (i) the training cost of low-skilled
workers and (ii) the relative size of the highly–skilled labour force. We …rst perform a
static exercise assessing the steady state implications of such changes in the model. We
then study the transitional dynamics delivered by the model in the face of such shocks.
This comparative analysis enables us to o¤er some insights on the role played by the
ladder e¤ect in Spanish unemployment dynamics.
4.1 Demand side: training cost
We model the relative demand shock as a change in the cost of training new low-skilled
employed.18 This change in the training cost may be seen as a consequence of a tech-
nological change. We assume that highly skilled workers do not require training: Given
their education level, we assume that they have exogenous general skills. In our model
the increase of this training cost can be interpreted as a skilled-biased technological shock
against low-skilled workers. Highly skilled workers are willing to accept low-skilled vacan-
cies temporarily. Despite their high separation rates, …rms hire highly skilled workers to
avoid general training costs inherent to the hiring of low-skilled workers. This training
cost a¤ects employment asymmetrically. An increase in this training cost decreases total
employment but more largely low-skilled employment.
Thus, we now analyse the e¤ects of a permanent increase in the training cost paid
by the …rm when hiring a low–skilled worker, {: Figures 2–3 report the e¤ects of a
permanent shock in { ranging from values 0.0 to 0.2, on the steady state of some key
variables characterising the labour market.
An increase in { induces …rms to reduce low-skilled employment. It therefore increases
the marginal value of low-skilled jobs, and decreases the marginal values of highly skilled
ones (see Figures 2 and 3). As the wage bargaining process implies that wages are strongly
correlated with the marginal productivity of employment, the real wage paid to highly
skilled workers when employed on highly skilled jobs, reduces more than that received
by low–skilled workers on low–skilled occupation (see Figure 2), reducing the wage gap
among them.
The increase in the value of the shock has two opposite e¤ects for the highly skilled
workers. On the one hand, the cost of low–skilled employment rises and …rms will reduce
hirings of both low and highly skilled workers. On the other hand, …rms will partially
substitute highly skilled workers for low–skilled ones to …ll low–skilled vacancies as the
former do not require any training. Overall, the low-skilled employment decreases most
(see Figure 2). This substitution e¤ect explain the huge drop in N l: Besides, noteworthy
18We have also considered a permanent non-biased technological shock. As in literature the increase in
the productivity of labour increases employment and decreases unemployment. However the e¤ect in the
equilibrium unemployment rates will be neutral. Interesting further research will be to keep in temporary
technological shocks in order to experience if there exists some relationship between technological shock
and “ladder e¤ect”.
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is the fact that N l drops dramatically more than both Nhl and N
h
h (see upper–left panel
of Figure 2), illustrating the substitution e¤ect between highly and low–skilled workers
in low–skilled occupations due to the increase in the training cost.
The reduction in the marginal value and the increase in the training cost therefore
discourages posting vacancies, whatever their type, as illustrated by Figure 2. For values
of { larger than 0.1, the reduction in the number of highly skilled vacancies is larger than
the reduction in low–skilled vacancies. This reduction in both types of vacancies and
the increase in unemployment reverses the congestion e¤ect.19 Therefore, the probability
that a …rm …lls a vacancy rises whatever the type of posted vacancy. But, as the increase
in unemployment is higher for low–skilled workers than for highly skilled ones, the rise in
this probability is much higher in the case of low–skilled workers, ql (by an order of about
5 when { takes value 0.2) . Likewise, the implied negative trade externality explains the
larger decrease in the probability to …nd a job for low–skilled workers. The investment
behaviour of …rms leads to employment reduction for these types of occupation.
Our results are consistent with Van Ours and Ridder (1995), which give evidence
that low- and highly skilled unemployment are strongly correlated and that low-skilled
unemployment ‡uctuates more strongly. For instance, in face of a value of { = 0:1, Nhh
and Nhl decrease by 5%, while N
l drops by an amount of 10%. This shows up in the
measure of the ladder e¤ect reported in Figure 4.
The ladder e¤ect, measured in terms of stocks,
LhNhl
LhNhl + L
lN l
£ 100;
illustrates the previous analysis. As the ladder e¤ect increases by 3% when { = 0:1 to
11% in face of { = 0:2, once again re‡ecting the expected substitution e¤ect between
highly and low–skilled workers that is at work in the face of a training cost applied to
low–skilled workers.
This e¤ect is far from proportional, and the higher the training cost, the larger the
ladder e¤ect becomes. It could be interpreted that in a society with rapid technological
progress, those less quali…ed will need more training to be able to work even in less
quali…ed vacancies. Stated otherwise, the low–skilled vacancies will require larger skills
and the cost of qualifying low–skilled workers will rise more than proportionally.
Then, highly skilled workers take priority over low-skilled workers to …ll these vacan-
cies. This leads to an increase in low-skilled unemployment. The e¤ect is an increase in
the “ladder” e¤ect indicator.
4.2 Supply Side: skilled labour force
There is a large amount of literature about the increase of skills in the labour force (see
Green et al. (1999)). This section analyses the e¤ects of a permanent increase in the
19Under the presence of coordination failures on the labour market, an increase of competition among
…rms creates a congestion e¤ect that lowers the probability of …lling up a vacant job.
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relative size of the highly skilled labour force — a positive shift in Lh=Ll — which might
be interpreted as an increase in the aggregate education attainments of workers.
Figures 5–6 report the e¤ects of a shock ranging from 1 to 19% on the steady state
of some key variables characterising the dynamics in the labour market.
The …rst direct implication of a permanent increase in the relative availability of highly
skilled workers is to shift downward the probability for this type of worker to …nd a job.
Indeed, the higher relative availability of this type of labour creates a congestion e¤ect on
the supply side which, via the matching process, makes it much harder for highly skilled
workers to …nd a job. Thus, as can be seen from Figure 6, both phh and p
h
l drop. For
instance, the probability for a highly skilled worker to …nd a highly skilled job diminishes
by 4% in face of a 5% permanent increase in Lh=Ll. On the contrary, it exerts a positive
trade externality that bene…ts the …rms and makes the probability of …lling a vacancy
higher. Noteworthy is that this e¤ect does exist both for highly skilled jobs (qhh) and
low–skilled jobs (qhl ), as skilled workers may apply to such jobs. Nevertheless, the e¤ect
is more pronounced on highly skilled jobs. Conversely, the probability to …ll a low–skilled
job with a low–skilled worker (ql) is lowered, as low–skilled workers are proportionally
scarcer, thus increasing the competition among …rms and creating a relative congestion
e¤ect.
The marginal values of employment that also depend on the labour market tightness
through the wage setting mechanism do not all increase. Indeed, only the marginal value
of low–skilled jobs increase while that of highly—skilled occupations decrease. This im-
plies that …rms post a higher number of low–skilled vacancies whereas the number of
highly skilled decreases, as Figure 5 shows. This together with the evolution of the prob-
ability to …ll vacancies implies that employment of low–skilled workers and highly skilled
workers employed as low–skilled increase, whereas that of highly skilled decreases. There-
fore low–skilled unemployment diminishes while highly skilled unemployment increases,
the overall e¤ect on total unemployment being slightly positive.
The overall e¤ect on wages is easily understood in the light of previous results as in-
creases in the marginal productivity of all types of employment exerts an upward pressure
on wages, which is countered by the decrease in the tightness of the highly skilled labour
market. Thus, while the real wages paid in compensation to low–skilled job increase,
those paid to highly skilled job decreases.
Beside these aggregate e¤ects, the measure of the ladder e¤ect — as reported in Figure
7 — re‡ects the earlier story, as increases in the relative size of the highly skilled labour
force lead to an increase in the ladder, implying that more extensive use of low–skilled
workers in low–skilled jobs is at work. This is explained as the increase in the probability
to …ll a low–skilled vacancy with a highly skilled worker makes it worth increasing the use
of this type of labour. In others an increase in the availability of highly skilled workers
implies that …rms substitute low–skilled workers for highly skilled ones in low–skilled
occupations. However, this is not enough to compensate for the rise in the highly skilled
labour supply, implying a larger level of highly skilled unemployment. It seems to provide
a pretty good explanation to the positive correlation between the rise in the number of
educated workers and in the highly skilled unemployment rate in the Spanish economy
during the eighties.
16
Figures from 8 to 9 …nally report the transitional dynamics of employment, unem-
ployment and vacancies that follows a 5% rise in the relative availability of highly skilled
labour force. As expected, …rms instantaneously post a larger number of low–skilled va-
cancies whereas the number of highly skilled vacancies drops by a larger amount (7.5%).
Therefore, the probability of …lling a highly skilled job increases due to the negative
congestion e¤ect and that associated with low–skilled vacancies decreases by a conges-
tion e¤ect. Therefore, highly skilled employment decreases whatever its utilisation while
low–skilled employment increases, explaining the behaviour of unemployment rates.
Nevertheless, the decrease in highly skilled employment yields an increase in the prob-
ability of …lling a highly skilled vacancy, pushing upward the marginal value of highly
skilled employment, such that after their initial decline highly skilled vacancies go up-
ward. However, this is not enough to push highly skilled employment back to the initial
steady state.
4.3 Comparative analysis
This analysis deserves additional comments that may shed light on the recent Spanish
experiment. We have introduced both demand and supply changes. Both shocks are
signi…cant to explain evolution of labour market variables, but the explicative amplitude
of these changes is di¤erent.
Ladder e¤ect and relative wages
From the last two sections, we observe that both training cost and relative labour
force changes are important to explain the “ladder e¤ect” and reproduce the same relative
wages evolution. They have similar e¤ects in both features, such a ladder e¤ect indicator
increases. Both explain that highly skilled workers take low-skilled jobs leading to a low-
skilled unemployment persistence. When we introduce a change in the training cost, both
highly skilled employment and low-skilled employment proportions decrease (see Figure
2). Since the former drops more than the latter, the ladder e¤ect indicator increases
very signi…cantly. Nevertheless, when a change in the relative highly skilled labour force
occurs the ladder e¤ect is due to both an increase in highly skilled employment working
in low-skilled jobs and the fact that low-skilled employment increases at a slower rate
(see Figure 5). In both shocks real wages paid to low–skilled job increase, while paid to
highly skilled job decreases.
Employment and vacancies
Their e¤ects on unemployment and vacancies rates are totally di¤erent. Both changes
reproduce the increase in highly skilled unemployment observed in Spanish data during
the period. However, the training cost change only reproduces the employment data.
Low-skilled unemployment only increases with the introduction of a training cost. In the
other shock, the low-skilled unemployment rate decreases. Hence, the training cost can
better explain the evolution of the “ladder e¤ect”.
Figures 10-12 report actual vacancies for the Spanish economy for our benchmark
sample. The ratio of highly to low–skilled vacancies diminishes within this period. Indeed,
as predicted by the model under any shock the ratio of highly skilled vacancies to low-
skilled vacancies reduces (see Figure 10). In the face of a labour supply shock, …rms post
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a lower number of highly skilled vacancies. This reduction is even larger in the case of a
greater training cost. Decreases in the number of highly skilled vacancies would rather
be explained by both labour force and the training cost shocks as shown in Figure 11.
When there was a change in the number of highly skilled workers, low–skilled vacancies
increased in the model. While the decrease in the number of the low–skilled vacancies
posted observed from Figure 12 provides empirical support to the training cost shock.
These results are understood in our framework of temporary jobs for highly skilled
employees who work in low-skilled jobs. The model is built with a exogenous separation
rate of 1 for this group. It leads to highly skilled employees to accept low-skilled vacancies
temporarily, given that a highly skilled worker really wants to …ll a highly skilled job. It
is consistent with the Spanish context where …xed-term employment contracts are more
‡exible from 1984. The number of temporary employment has growth from 15.6% in 1985
to 33.6% in 1996 (see Dolado et al., 2001). From our results, …rms prefer to take a highly
skilled worker for a low-skilled job to avoid general training costs of low-skilled workers,
which is interpreted as a technological change. This leads to an increase in low-skilled
unemployment. It is also consistent with the idea that general skills of highly skilled
workers allow more ‡exibility to change the job. However, the importance of the increase
of the number of highly skilled workers is not negligible at all as we have commented
in this section. The change in the labour supply can also reproduce the increase in the
indicator of ladder e¤ect in Spain. These results indicate further research should be done
to study interrelations between demand and supply.
5 Conclusion
This paper attempts to shed light on alternative explanations for the “ladder e¤ect”
phenomenon, which is a signi…cant source of Spanish unemployment persistence.
We have used a calibrated version of the model to assess the implications of labour
demand and supply shocks. The labour demand shocks are related to the increase of
the training cost in low-skilled vacancies and are seen as a biased technological progress
against low–skilled workers. Labour supply shocks, often associated with increases in the
number of highly-skilled workers, are introduced as increases in the relative availability
of a highly–skilled labour force. Our results indicate that the ladder e¤ect generated
by the model may account for the recent Spanish experience. The model can replicate
the observed decline in the ratio of high to low–skilled vacancies, and shows how …rms
substitute high for low–skilled employment. We argue that the Spanish ladder e¤ect
re‡ected by an increase in the training cost as a result of a biased shock against low–skilled
workers is better reproduced than the increase in the number of highly-skilled workers.
The positive change in the training cost of the low-skilled workers better reproduce the
evolution on employment and in particular the decrease of low-skilled employment, as
well as the evolution of the vacancy data.
What remains to be investigated is the extent to which the ladder-e¤ect merely re‡ects
the role of education as an entry screening device by …rms, which in turn would imply
that o¢cial job descriptions may have little relation to job-content.
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Tables
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
high-sk. emp. as high-skilled. (Nhh ) 36.9 39.7 40.2 41.5 45.3
high-sk. emp. as low-skilled.(Nhl ) 42.3 45.0 43.6 36.5 34.6
high-sk. unemployment (Uh) 20.6 15.2 16.1 21.9 20.0
low-sk. emp. as low-skilled.(N l) 80.7 83.4 80.9 75.0 76.9
low-sk. unemployment (U l) 19.2 16.5 19.0 24.9 23.0
rat. high ov. low-skilled. popul. (Lh=Ll) 20.8 24.6 28.3 33.5 39.5
ladder e¤ec. ind. (Nhl L
h=(Nhl L
h +N lLl)) 9.8 11.7 13.2 14.0 15.1
Source: Own calculations from EPA data. The superscript denotes the education: high-skilled (h) and
low-skilled (l). The subscript indicates the occupation. Education:h=superior and upper secondary
and l=low secondary, primary and without studies. Occupation h=range 1-3 in EPA classi…cation (see
appendix B) and l=range 0 and range 4 to 9 from EPA classi…cation.
Table 1: Labour rates by education-occupation (%)
Aggregated Ratios and Probabilities
capital/output ratio k=y 9.8458
investment/output ratio i=y 0.2877
consumption/output ratio c=y 0.6923
high–skilled workers in high–skilled occupations Nhh 0.4027
high–skilled workers in low–skilled occupations Nhl 0.4102
low–skilled workers in low–skilled occupations N l 0.7958
prob. for a high–skilled to …nd a high–skilled job phh 0.0526
prob. for a high–skilled to …nd a low–skilled job phl 0.0915
prob. for a low–skilled to …nd a low–skilled job pl 0.1384
ratio high over low–skilled population Lh=Ll 0.2847
Not …lled high–skilled vacancies over high–sk. labour force V ?h 0.0093
Not …lled low–skilled vacancies over low–sk.labour force V ?l 0.0082
Table 2: Aggregated Ratios and Probabilities (average)
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Behavioural parameters
elasticity of output wrt capital ® 0.3471
elasticity of output wrt high–skilled labour µ 0.1143
depreciation rate ± 0.0292
discount factor ¯ 0.9940
cost of posting low-vacancies !l 0.8626
cost of posting high-vacancies !h 0.0652
cost of working in a high-job ¡h 0.7314
cost of working in a low-job ¡hl = ¡
l 0.5363
cost of no working ¡h
¤
= ¡l
¤
0.0000
training costs { 0.0000
total factor productivity A 0.6083
elasticity of matching w.r.t. vacancies ° 0.5000
bargaining power f»jigi;j2fh;lg 0.5000
Table 3: Behavioural parameters
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Labour market variables and probabilities
hirings of high–sk. workers for high–skilled jobs Hhh 0.0314
hirings of high–sk. workers for low–skilled jobs Hhl 0.0547
hirings of low–sk. workers for low–skilled jobs H l 0.0282
e¢. factor of high–sk. workers for high–sk. jobs H
h
h 0.2014
e¢. factor sk. workers for low–skilled. jobs H
h
l 0.7234
e¢. factor sk. workers for low–skilled. jobs H
l
0.3275
wages of high-sk. workers for high-skilled jobs whh 0.9027
wages of high-sk.workers for low-sk. jobs whl 0.5632
wages of low-skilled workers wl 0.5801
high–skilled separation rate s 0.0780
low–skilled separation rate ¹ 0.0355
prob. …rm …lls h-skilled vac. with h-skilled workers qhh 0.7715
prob. …rm …lls l-skilled vac. with h-skilled workers qhl 0.7620
prob. …rm …lls l-skilled vac. with low–skilled workers ql 0.7751
high–skilled vacancies V h 0.0407
low–skilled vacancies V l 0.1532
Table 4: Calibrated parameters (Labour Market)
Level of Studies for Labor Force (%)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995
Illiter. and uned. 11,45 11,11 10,90 9,49 8,19 7,41 6,80
Primary School 44,92 40,84 36,24 34,35 30,67 29,29 27,45
Low-Sec. School 34,60 38,30 42,12 44,67 49,06 50,70 52,06
Upper-Sec. School 4.66 5,19 5,52 5,64 5,97 6,04 6,54
Superior 4.37 4,56 5,22 5,85 6,11 6,57 7,15
source: EPA
Table 5: Level of Studies for Labor Force (%)
Level of Studies for Unemployment (%)
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995
Illite. and uned. 18,63 19,80 16,42 17,87 24,38 25,25 24,84
Primary School. 16,72 15,32 13,76 14,23 21,10 21,09 27,00
Low-Sec. School. 29,19 25,81 20,09 19,49 26,41 26,25 24,80
Upper-Sec. School. 16,30 16,15 12,28 11,12 15,40 16,98 17,67
Superior School. 17,49 15,24 13,77 12,37 17,18 16,92 16,38
source: EPA
Table 6: Level of Studies for Unemployment (%)
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Figures
Low skilled
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 jobs
Nhh
Low vacancy jobs
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Figure 1: Flows in the labour market between employment, unemployment and jobs.
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Figure 2: Steady state implication of training cost shock
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Figure 3: Steady state implication of training cost shock
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Figure 4: The ladder e¤ect when { changes
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Figure 5: Steady state implication of relative labour force shock
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Figure 6: Steady state implication of relative labour force shock
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Figure 8: Transitional dynamics in unemployment and vacancies
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Figure 9: Transitional dynamics in employment
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Figure 10: Vacancy ratio V h=V l
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Figure 11: High-skilled vacancies
27
020000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
87
1
87
2
87
3
87
4
88
1
88
2
88
3
88
4
89
1
89
2
89
3
89
4
90
1
90
2
90
3
90
4
91
1
91
2
91
3
91
4
92
1
92
2
92
3
92
4
93
1
93
2
93
3
93
4
94
1
94
2
94
3
94
4
96
1
96
2
96
3
96
4
Figure 12: Low-skilled vacancies
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Appendix A
Appendix A:1 : Decisions Rules of Firm j:
Recall that production function of the …rm j is given by:
Yj;t = AK
®
j;t(L
hNhh;j;t)
µ
¡
LhNhl;j;t + L
lN lj;t
¢1¡®¡µ
: (A.1.1)
Accumulation of capital is,
Kj;t+1 = Ij;t + (1¡ ±)Kj;t (A.1.2)
The law of motion of each type of employment are given by:
Nhh;j;t+1 = q
h
h;tV
h
j;t + (1¡ s)Nhh;j;t (A.1.3)
Nhl;j;t+1 = q
h
l;tV
l
j;t
Ll
Lh
(A.1.4)
N lj;t+1 = q
l
t
¡
1¡ qhl;t
¢
V lj;t + (1¡ ¹)N lj;t: (A.1.5)
At period t instantaneous pro…t can be expressed as
¦j;t = Yj;t ¡ whtNhh;j;tLh ¡ wltNhl;j;tLh ¡ wltN lj;tLl ¡ Ij;t ¡ !hV hj;tLh (A.1.6)
¡!lV lj;tLl ¡ {H ltLl:
Then the …rm solves the recursive problem
max¨(SFj;t) = ¦j;t +
1
1 + rt+1
¨(SFj;t+1)
subject to (A.1.1)–(A.1.6). We form the Lagrangian for this problem. Let us denote the
Lagrange multipliers associated to Kj;t; Nhh;j;t, N
h
l;j;t and N
l
j;t respectively by X
k
j;t, X
h
h;j;t,
Xhl;j;t and X
l
j;t.
The …rst order conditions associated to the control variables investment, Ij;t and
vacancies, V hj;t and V
l
j;t; are given by
Xkj;t = 1 (A.1.7)
Xhh;j;t =
!h
qhh;t
(A.1.8)
qhl;tX
h
l;j;t + q
l
t(1¡ qhl;t)X lj;t = !l + {qlt(1¡ qhl;t): (A.1.9)
Equation (A.1.7) represents optimal level of investment, the marginal cost of capital goods
for the …rm that is one. Equation (A.1.8) represents the optimal level of highly–skilled
vacancies posted by a …rm. The …rst order condition (A.1.9) is the marginal value for
the …rm to …ll a low-skilled job complemented by an additional cost of training to hire a
low-skilled worker.
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The marginal values of the capital and the di¤erent types of employment for the …rm
are given by the envelope theorem as:
-kjt =
@¨j;t(S
F
j;t)
@Kj;t
= ®
Yj;t+1
Kj;t+1
+ 1¡ ±
-hh;jt =
@¨j;t(S
F
j;t)
@Nhh;j;t
= µ
Yj;t
LhNhh;j;t
¡ whj;t + (1¡ s)Xhh;j;t
-hl;jt =
@¨j;t(S
F
j;t)
@Nhl;j;t
= (1¡ ®¡ µ) Yj;t
(LhNhl;j;t + L
lN lj;t)
¡ whl;j;t
-ljt =
@¨j;t(S
F
j;t)
@N lj;t
= (1¡ ®¡ µ) Yj;t
(LhNhl;j;t + L
lN lj;t)
¡ wlj;t + (1¡ ¹)X lj;t:
Combining both envelope conditions and …rst order conditions, we get the Euler equa-
tions related to Kj;t, Nhh;j;t, N
h
l;j;t and N
l
j;t,
µ
®
Yj;t+1
Kj;t+1
+ 1¡ ±
¶
= 1 + rt+1 (A.1.10)
Xhh;j;t =
1
1 + rt+1
Ã
µ
Yj;t+1
LhNhh;j;t+1
¡ whj;t+1+
+(1¡ s)Xhh;j;t+1
!
(A.1.11)
Xhl;j;t =
1
1 + rt+1
Ã
(1¡ ®¡ µ) Yj;t+1
(LhNhl;j;t+1+L
lN lj;t+1)
¡
¡whl;j;t+1
!
(A.1.12)
X lj;t =
1
1 + rt+1
Ã
(1¡ ®¡ µ) Yj;t+1
(LhNhl;j;t+1+L
lN lj;t+1)
¡
¡wlj;t+1 + (1¡ ¹)X lj;t+1
!
: (A.1.13)
Furthermore, parameters will be chosen in such a way that the …rm will prefer to hire
a highly skilled worker instead of a low skilled worker for an unskilled vacancy,
Xhl;j;t > X lj;t:
This condition will be satis…ed at the steady state.
Appendix A:2 : The households
We follow Andolfatto (1996), in order to solve the problem of households. Workers
‡ows are determined according to the matching process we described in section 2.3.
Therefore, workers are randomly selected playing a game of “musical chairs”. At the
beginning of each period, the whole labour force is randomly shu-ed across a given set
of jobs.
A.2.1 The low-skilled consumer problem
This section presents the derivation of the optimal behaviour of the low–skilled con-
sumer, insisting on insurance issues.
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At the beginning of each period low–skilled households face di¤erent probabilities of
being employed or unemployed as this is contingent on its status in the labour market in
the previous period. This therefore implies that 2N di¤erent possible stories in the labour
market are to be considered after N periods, each of which corresponds to a particular
worker employment path and therefore a di¤erent story of accumulation. This leads
to heterogeneity, which makes the resolution of the model extremely complicated. For
the sake of simplicity, we follow Hansen (1985), and assume that there exists a perfect
insurance system which may eliminate ex–post heterogeneity.
The instantaneous utility functions are given by
uli;t = log(C
l
i;t ¡ ¡l) (employed) (A.2.1)
ul
¤
i;t = log(C
l¤
i;t ¡ ¡l
¤
) (unemployed) (A.2.2)
where uli;t and u
l¤
i;t are the respective instantaneous utility functions for employed and
unemployed households. As in the main body of the text, we let C lit and C
l¤
it denote the
respective low-skilled household’s consumption when employed and unemployed. ¡l and
¡l
¤
can be interpreted as a utility cost, expressed in terms of goods, associated with the
situation of the household in the labour market. We assume ¡l > ¡l
¤
, which ensures that
the consumption of an employee is greater than that of an unemployed household.
At the very beginning of each period — before the matching process has taken place
— the low-skilled household does not know what the situation, either employed or un-
employed, will be in that period. As a consequence, the household seeks to maximise
her expected value. Since there N lt denotes the percentage of low–skilled households that
are employed. And ¯ 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor of the household. The low-skilled
household maximises the problem
VL(Sli;t) = N li;tuli;t + (1¡N li;t)ul
¤
i;t + ¯VL(Sli;t+1); (A.2.3)
where state variables are Sli;t = S
l
i;tfBlj:t; Bl¤i;tg depending whether the household is em-
ployed or unemployed, are to be considered. We made use of the fact that by de…nition
of plt and the law of motion of N
l
t+1
N lt+1 = p
l
t(1¡N lt) + (1¡ ¹)N lt (A.2.4)
The household faces the two budget constraints
C lit + ¿
l
t%
l
it +B
l
it+1  (1 + rt)Blit + wlit, if employed (A.2.5)
C l
?
it + ¿
l
t%
l
it +B
l?
it+1  (1 + rt)Bl
?
it + %
l
it, if unemployed (A.2.6)
where Bli;t and B
l¤
i;t denote bond holdings carried over from the previous period. At the
beginning of each period. The household receives the real wage, wlit when employed
and the insurance payment, %lit, when unemployed. Its expenditures, either employed or
unemployed, are consumption, insurance contracts purchased at price ¿ lt and bonds.
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The problem of the household is therefore to solve the Bellman equation — and
therefore maximise the intertemporal utility function — subject to (A.2.5) and (A.2.6).
¤li;t and ¤
l¤
i;t; denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with budget constraint of the
representative low-skilled household when employed and unemployed respectively. The
problem may be stated as a Lagrangian in the following way:20
L = N ltuli;t + (1¡N lt)ul¤i;t + ¯VL(Sli;t+1)
+N lt¤
l
i;t
¡
(1 + rt)B
l
it + w
l
it ¡ C lit ¡ ¿ lt%lit ¡Blit+1
¢
+(1¡N lt)¤l¤i;t
¡
(1 + rt)B
l?
it + %
l
it ¡ C l
?
it ¡ ¿ lt%lit ¡Bl
?
it+1
¢
The …rst order necessary conditions associated to the problem are therefore First order
conditions with respect to C lit, C
l?
it ; %
l
it are:
(C lit ¡ ¡l)¡1 = ¤lit (A.2.7)
(C l
?
it ¡ ¡l?)¡1 = ¤l
?
it (A.2.8)
¡®li;t¿ lt¤lit + (1¡ ®li;t)(1¡ ¿ lt)¤l
?
it = 0 (A.2.9)
Equations (A.2.7) and (A.2.8) state that the Lagrange multipliers ¤lit and ¤
l?
itare equal to
the marginal value of consumption, considering the alternative states of being employed
or unemployed respectively. The …rst order condition (A.2.9) represents the marginal
value to be fully insured against unemployment.
The …rst order conditions related to Blit+1 and B
l?
it+1 are:
¤lit = ¯
@VL(Sli;t+1)
@Blit+1
(A.2.10)
¤l
¤
it = ¯
@VL(Sli;t+1)
@Bl
¤
it+1
(A.2.11)
Finally the envelope therefore implies
@VL(Sli;t)
@Blit
= (1 + rt)¤
l
it (A.2.12)
@VL(Sli;t)
@Bl
¤
it
= (1 + rt)¤
l?
it (A.2.13)
Envelope conditions together with …rst order conditions related to optimal portfolio com-
position yields the following Euler conditions:
¤lit = ¯(1 + rt+1)¤
l
it+1 (A.2.14)
¤l
?
it = ¯(1 + rt+1)¤
l?
it+1: (A.2.15)
Insurance Company for low-skilled households: The expected pro…t of the insurance
company is given by the di¤erence from the gain of the prime of insurance times the
20Note that the Lagrange multipliers are just normalized by N lt and 1 ¡ N lt for convenience.
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insurances and the payment of insurance to people who were unemployed. We assume
free entry on the insurance market, pro…ts are driven to zero, such that
¦t = ¿
l
t%
l
it ¡ (1¡N lt)%lit = 0
We assume the company insures the current unemployment risk. The company can
not di¤erentiate from the state of low-skilled households. People insurance against the
probability of being unemployed and the optimal prime for the company is
¿ lt = 1¡N lt : (A.2.16)
Using these results in the optimal choice for insurance (A.2.16) in equation (A.2.9), we
end up with
¤li;t = ¤
l¤
i;t
for low-skilled households, whether they were employed or unemployed in the previous
period. This condition actually states that the marginal utility of wealth is independent
from the state of the household in the labour market, which therefore eliminates hetero-
geneity in saving behaviour. Using this condition together with equations (A.2.7) and
(A.2.8), we obtain C lit = C
l¤
it + ¡
l ¡ ¡l¤: Low-skilled households have di¤erent consump-
tion levels when employed or unemployed, C li;t and C
l¤
i;t; but they prefer to be completely
insured in terms of utility.
It also implies that equations (A.2.14) and (A.2.15) are equivalent and households
accumulate the same quantity of bonds whether they are employed or unemployed,
Blit+1 = B
l¤
it+1 = Bit+1: As a matter of fact, households choose to be completely in-
sured, and have the same wealth in any state. This implies that saving decisions are
independent of the employment history of the household. The optimal insurance is found
using constraints (A.2.5) and (A.2.6):
%lit = w
l
ij;t + ¡
l ¡ ¡l¤:
As soon as households choose to be fully insured, and provided the employed labour
force is selected randomly across jobs at the beginning of each period, we are back with
the standard representative consumer, and the notation used to distinguish employment
status may be eliminated. The representative low-skilled household i maximises the
expectation of the discounted sum of its instantaneous utility with respect to the con-
sumption and the assets she holds:
1X
t=0
¯t
©
N ltu
l
i;t + (1¡N lt)ul
?
i;t
ª
subject to (A.2.17). Equation (A.2.17) is the consolidated budget constraint after we
introduce perfect assurance:
N ltC
l
i;t + (1¡N lt)C l
?
i;t +B
l
i;t+1  N ltwlijt + (1 + rt)Bli;t: (A.2.17)
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A.2.2.The highly-skilled consumer problem
Like the problem of the low–skilled worker, the highly–skilled worker faces di¤erent
states on the labour market.
Chh;it, C
h
l;it, and C
h?
it denote the respective highly-skilled household’s consumption and
¡h, ¡l and ¡h
¤
can be interpreted as a utility cost, expressed in terms of goods, associated
with the situation of the household in the labour market. We suppose that ¡hl = ¡
l, given
that they work in a low-skilled job. We further assume ¡h > ¡l > ¡h
¤
, which ensures
that consumption of an employee in a highly-skilled vacancy is greater than that in a
low-skilled vacancy and both greater than that of an unemployed household.
Bhh;it, B
h
l;it and B
h?
it denote contingent claims purchased by the highly-skilled household
in the previous period. At the beginning of each period, the household receives the
value of bonds purchased in the previous period, either highly-employed, low-employed or
unemployed. She also receives the wage when employed as a highly-skilled, the wage when
employed as a low-skilled plus the insurance payment for this unsatisfactory situation
and the insurance payment when unemployed. Its expenditures, either employed or
unemployed, are consumption, insurance and purchase of bonds.
The instantaneous utility contingent to be employed in a highly-skilled or low-skilled
job and unemployed are,
uhh;it = log(C
h
h;it ¡ ¡h) (employed in a highly-skilled job) (A.2.18)
uhl;it = log(C
h
l;it ¡ ¡l) (employed in a low-skilled job) (A.2.19)
uh¤it = log(C
l¤
i;t ¡ ¡l
¤
) (unemployed) (A.2.20)
As in the problem of a low–skilled worker, the highly-skilled household maximises the
recursively problem
VH(Shit) = Nhh;tuhh;i;t +Nhl;tuhl;i;t + (1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t)uh¤i;t + ¯VH(Shit+1); (A.2.21)
where state variables have three alternative states depending whether the household is
employed as highly-skilled or low-skilled or unemployed. ¯ 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor.
We made use of the fact that by de…nition of phh;t, p
h
l;t and the law of motion of N
h
h;t+1
and Nhl;t+1.
Nhh;t+1 = p
h
h;t(1¡Nhh;t) + (1¡ s)Nhh;t (A.2.22)
Nhl;t+1 = p
h
l;t(1¡Nhh;t+1): (A.2.23)
Highly skilled worker maximises her household’s problem taking into account her
discounted expected value — solve the Bellman equation subject to the budget constraints
Chh;it + ¿
h
t %
h
it + ¿
h¤
t %
h¤
it +B
h
h;it+1  (1 + rt)Bhh;it + whh;it (A.2.24)
Chl;it + ¿
h
t %
h
it + ¿
h¤
t %
h¤
it +B
h
l;it+1  (1 + rt)Bhl;it + whl;it + %hit (A.2.25)
Ch
?
it + ¿
h
t %
h
it + ¿
h¤
t %
h¤
it +B
h?
it+1  (1 + rt)Bh
?
it + %
h¤
it (A.2.26)
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where %h
¤
it and %
h
it; are the insurance contracts with respective prices ¿
h¤
t and ¿
h
t . The
household chooses among both type of contracts to be insured against the probability
of being unemployed or employed in a low-skilled job. When she works as a low–skilled
employee, she receives %hit to compensate the wage di¤erential with respect to a highly–
skilled job. When unemployed, she receives %h
¤
it as unemployment bene…t. ¤
h
h;it, ¤
h
l;it and
¤h
?
it denote the Lagrange multipliers associated to budget constraint of the representative
highly-skilled household when highly-employed, low-employed and unemployed, respec-
tively.
As in the problem of the low–skilled worker, we …rst form the Lagrangian
L = Nhh;tuhh;i;t +Nhl;tuhl;i;t + (1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t)uh¤i;t + ¯VH(Shit+1)
+Nhh;t¤
h
h;i;t
µ
(1 + rt)B
h
h;it + w
h
h;it ¡ Chh;it¡
¡¿ht %hit ¡ ¿h¤t %h¤it ¡Bhh;it+1
¶
+Nhl;t¤
h
l;i;t
µ
(1 + rt)B
h
l;it + w
h
l;it + %
h
it ¡ Chl;it¡
¡¿ht %hit ¡ ¿h¤t %h¤it ¡Bhl;it+1
¶
(1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t)¤h¤i;t
µ
(1 + rt)B
h?
it + %
h¤
it ¡ Ch?it ¡
¡¿ht %hit ¡ ¿h¤t %h¤it ¡Bh?it+1
¶
:
The …rst order conditions with respect to Chh;it, C
h
l;it, C
h?
it ; %
h
it and %
h¤
it are:
(Chh;it ¡ ¡h)¡1 = ¤hh;it (A.2.27)
(Chl;it ¡ ¡l)¡1 = ¤hl;it (A.2.28)
(Ch
?
it ¡ ¡h
¤
)¡1 = ¤h
?
it (A.2.29)
¡Nhh;t¿ht¤hh;it +Nhl;t(1¡ ¿ht )¤hl;it ¡ (1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t)¿ht¤h
?
it = 0 (A.2.30)
¡Nhh;t¿h
¤
t ¤
h
h;it ¡Nhl;t¿h
¤
t ¤
h
l;it + (1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t)(1¡ ¿h
¤
t )¤
h?
it = 0: (A.2.31)
Equations (A.2.27), (A.2.28) and (A.2.29) state that the Lagrange multipliers ¤hh;it,¤
h
l;it
and ¤h
?
it are equal to the marginal value of consumption in the corresponding state on the
labour market. The …rst order conditions (A.2.30) and (A.2.31) represent the marginal
values to be fully assured taking into account the probability of being employed in a
low-skilled job or unemployed respectively.
The …rst order conditions related to Bhh;it+1, B
h
l;it+1 and B
h?
it+1 are:
¤hh;it = ¯
@VH(Shit+1)
@Bhh;it+1
(A.2.32)
¤hl;it = ¯
@VH(Shit+1)
@Bhl;it+1
(A.2.33)
¤h
¤
it = ¯
@VH(Shit+1)
@Bh
?
it+1
: (A.2.34)
Envelope theorem related to Bhh;it, B
h
l;it and B
h?
it yields
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@VH(Shit)
@Bhh;it
= (1 + rt)¤
h
h;it (A.2.35)
@VH(Shit)
@Bhl;it
= (1 + rt)¤
h
l;it (A.2.36)
@VH(Shit)
@Bh
¤
it
= (1 + rt)¤
h¤
it : (A.2.37)
Envelope conditions together with …rst order conditions related to optimal portfolio
composition yields the following Euler conditions:
¤hh;it = ¯(1 + rt+1)¤
h
h;it+1 (A.2.38)
¤hl;it = ¯(1 + rt+1)¤
h
l;it+1 (A.2.39)
¤h
?
it = ¯(1 + rt+1)¤
h?
it+1: (A.2.40)
Similarly to the low-skilled problem, we can express the problem of an insurance
company for highly-skilled households as
¦ = ¿ht %
h
it + ¿
h¤
t %
h¤
it ¡Nhl;t%hit ¡ (1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t)%h
¤
it = 0;
from which we get ¿ht = N
h
l;t and ¿
h¤
t = (1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t).
These results together with household’s …rst order conditions implies:
¤hh;it = ¤
h
l;it = ¤
h?
it
Bhh;it = B
h
l;it = B
h?
it
which, together with the Frischian demand for consumption, yields
Chh;it ¡ ¡h = Chl;it ¡ ¡l = Ch?it ¡ ¡?:
Therefore, the levels of insurance are given by %hit = w
h
h;it + ¡
l ¡ ¡h ¡ whl;it and %h¤it =
whh;it + ¡
h¤ ¡ ¡h.
To summarise, as in the low–skilled worker problem, as soon as households choose to be
fully insured, and provided the employed labour force is selected randomly across jobs at
the beginning of each period, we are back with the standard representative consumer, and
the notation used to distinguish employment status may be eliminated. A representative
highly-skilled household i therefore maximises the expectation of the discounted sum of
her instantaneous utility with respect to the consumption and the assets she holds:
1X
t=0
¯t
©
Nhh;tu
h
h;i;t +N
h
l;tu
h
l;i;t + (1¡Nhh;t ¡Nhl;t)uh
?
i;t
ª
subject to (A.2.41). Equation (A.2.42) is the consolidated budget constraint when we
introduce perfect assurance:
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Nhh;tC
h
h;i;t +N
h
l;tC
h
l;i;t + U
h
t C
h?
i;t +B
h
i;t+1  Nhh;twhh;ijt +Nhl;twhl;ijt + (1 + rt)Bhi;t: (A.2.41)
Appendix A:3 :Wage determination
This section is devoted to the exposition of the wage bargaining process, which is
determined by a Nash bargaining criterion, therefore yielding a surplus sharing rule. At
the beginning of every period a re-negotiation simultaneously occurs between the …rm
and workers of each group. Otherwise there will be many wages as workers and the
macroeconomic dynamic would be done with respect to a wages distribution. Therefore,
workers negotiate their wages with the …rm and they account for separations and hirings
probabilities.
The wage setting behaviour is obtained maximising the following Nash criterion with
respect to the wages which maximise the weighted product of the workers’ and the …rm’s
net return from the di¤erent job match.
The gains of the …rm corresponds to marginal values. Thus, let -¿`;jt the surplus of
the …rm associated to each group of employment. The gains for workers’ correspond
to the sum of the utilities when they are employed minus the sum of utilities when the
negotiation fails and they become unemployed. Let ª
¿
`it
¤it
the di¤erent surplus of workers
associated to each group of workers in terms of goods. Where (¿ ; `) = f(h; h); (h; l); (l; :)g
and »¿` are the exogenous parameters of bargaining powers of each group of workers. Thus,
the Nash bargaining criterion problem to solve is
max
w¿`ijt
¡
-¿`;jt
¢1¡»¿` µª¿`it
¤it
¶»¿`
:
We de…ne the surplus of the …rm and the workers as following:
A.3.1. The …rm j surplus
Let us …rst characterise the surplus which accrues to a …rm j when it employs a highly–
skilled worker on a highly–skilled position. This is essentially given by the marginal
value of a highly–skilled employment, -hh;jt. From the optimal condition associated with
a highly–skilled employment, we get
-hh;jt = µ
Yjt
LhNhh;jt
¡ whh;ijt + (1¡ s)Xhh;jt (A.3.1)
Likewise in the case of a highly–skilled worker employed on a low–skilled position, the
marginal value of employment is given by
-hl;jt = (1¡ ®¡ µ)
Yjt
LhNhl;jt + L
lN ljt
¡ whl;ijt: (A.3.2)
Finally, when it hires an additional low–skilled worker, this gain is given by
-ljt = (1¡ ®¡ µ)
Yjt
LhNhl;jt + L
lN ljt
¡ wlijt + (1¡ ¹)X ljt (A.3.3)
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where Xhh;jt and X
l
jt are the Lagrange multipliers associated to employment laws of
motion.
A.3.2.The household i surplus
Let us now present the determination of the surplus which accrues to each type of
worker.
The low–skilled worker:
A low–skilled worker, when employed in period t, instantaneously derives utility as-
sociated to her extra gains in the labour market (¤it times the wage revenues net of
disutility of labour in terms of goods). Furthermore, in the next period, she may still be
employed with probability (1 ¡ ¹) or laid o¤ with probability ¹. Therefore, the utility
gain of an employed low–skilled worker in the labour market, ¨el;it, is given by
¨el;it = ¤it(w
l
ijt ¡ ¡l) + ¯
¡
(1¡ ¹)¨el;it+1 + ¹¨ul;it+1
¢
where ¤it21 is the marginal utility of consumption. Likewise, when unemployed, the
low-skilled household gets, ¨ulit
¨ul;it = ¡¤it¡l
¤
+ ¯
¡
pl;t¨
e
l;it+1 + (1¡ pl;t)¨ul;it+1
¢
:
Then, the net surplus of a low–skilled worker in the labour market is given by
ªlit ´ ¨el;it ¡¨ul;it = ¤it(wlijt + ¡l? ¡ ¡l) + ¯(1¡ ¹¡ pl;t)ªlit+1: (A.3.4)
The highly–skilled worker:
A highly–skilled worker may be employed either in a highly–skilled or a low–skilled
vacancy, or may be unemployed. When employed as a highly–skilled worker, she instanta-
neously derives utility ¤it(W ht ¡¡h), and in the following period she may be unemployed
or employed on either a highly or a low–skilled position. Therefore, the utility gain in the
labour market for a highly–skilled worker employed on a highly–skilled position is given
by
¨hh;it = ¤it(w
h
h;ijt ¡ ¡h) + ¯
µ
(1¡ s)¨hh;it+1 + sphl;t¨hl;it+1+
+s(1¡ phl;t)¨hu;it+1
¶
where¨hh;it, ¨
h
l;it and¨
h
uit respectively denote the utility gain when a highly–skilled worker
employed in a highly–skilled job, in a low–skilled job or unemployed worker.
Following the same procedure, the value of a highly-skilled worker employed in a
low–skilled position is
¨hl;it = ¤it(W
h
l;ijt ¡ ¡l) + ¯
µ
phh;t¨
h
h;it+1 + (1¡ phh;t)phl;t¨hl;it+1+
+(1¡ phl;t)(1¡ phh;t)¨hu;it+1
¶
21From Appendix A.1, we can see that ¤li;t = ¤
l¤
i;t = ¤i;t
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and similarly the value when unemployed is
¨hu;it = ¡¤it¡h
?
+ ¯
µ
phh;t¨
h
h;it+1 + (1¡ phh;t)phl;t¨hl;it+1+
+(1¡ phl;t)(1¡ phh;t)¨hu;it+1
¶
:
The surplus of a highly–skilled worker, when employed on a highly–skilled position, is
actually given by the gain from being employed as a highly-skilled worker minus the gain
from being employed as a low–skilled worker times the probability that this event occurs,
minus the gain from being unemployed, times the probability of being unemployed. Such
that the overall surplus is given by (using the law of large number)
ªhh;it ´ ¨hh;it ¡ phl;t¡1¨hl;it ¡ (1¡ phl;t¡1)¨hu;it = ¤it(whl;ijt + ¡h
? ¡ ¡l)
ªhh;it = ¤it
µ
whh;ijt ¡ ¡h ¡
Nhl;t
1¡Nhh;t
(whl;ijt ¡ ¡l)
+
Ã
1¡ N
h
l;t
1¡Nhh;t
!
¡h
¤
¶
+ (1¡ s¡ phh;t)ªhh;it+1: (A.3.5)
When bargaining on a low–skilled job, the only opportunity left is unemployment such
that the surplus is now given by the di¤erence between the utility gains from being
employed on a low–skilled position minus the utility gains from being unemployed
ªhl;it ´ ¨hl;it ¡¨hu;it = ¤it(W hl;ijt + ¡h
? ¡ ¡l): (A.3.6)
We now examine the Nash bargaining process that determines the real wage in each
case.
The Nash–Bargaining process
The wage setting behaviour is obtained maximizing the following Nash criterion
max
W ¿`ijt
¡
-¿`;jt
¢1¡»¿` µª¿`it
¤it
¶»¿`
where (¿ ; `) = f(h; h); (h; l); (l; :)g. The …rst order condition associated to this program
– making use of the de…nitions of the corresponding surpluses — yields
»¿`
1¡ »¿`
-¿`;jt =
ª¿`;it
¤it
:
The marginal values of employment of the household and the …rm together with the above
equation implies
whh;t = »
h
h
Ã
µ
Yt
LhNhh;t
+ phh;tX
h
h;t
!
+ (1¡ »hh)
Ã
¡h+
+
Nhl;t
1¡Nhh;t
(whl;t ¡ ¡l)
!
(A.3.7)
whl;t = »
h
l
Ã
(1¡ ®¡ µ) Yjt
LhNhl;jt + L
lN ljt
!
+ (1¡ »hh)¡l (A.3.8)
wlt = »
l
Ã
(1¡ ®¡ µ) Yjt
LhNhl;jt + L
lN ljt
+ ptX
l
t
!
+ (1¡ »l)¡l (A.3.9)
39
assuming a symmetric equilibrium, and using the fact that, in our calibration, We have
assumed ¡l
¤
= ¡h
¤
= 0.
Appendix B: Stylised facts and data de…nitions
Spanish education levels have steadily grown from the beginning of the 80’s and
especially from the middle of the 80’s. We can see in Table 5 the evolution of education
level for the Spanish labour force. The Illiterate and Primary Schooling have steadily
reduced the weight in the Spanish labour force. The increase in education has greatly
enlarged the secondary group and has made the top educated people (Upper-secondary
+Superior schooling) increase its weight by 100% in the labour force.
But the most problematic issue is the high persistence of the unemployment rates in
those low-skilled groups. Illiterate and Primary Schooling have worsened their unemploy-
ment rates during the last decade while the top educated largely reduce unemployment
rates in the booms and do not increase so much in the crisis (see Table 6).
Employment data
Linked labour Population Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa enlazada, EPA here-
after). This quarterly survey collects data of same individuals during six consecutive
quarters periods. It covers a large number of individuals and characteristics, such as
formal education attainment, occupation, employment status, age and gender. For our
estimations and stylised facts we have used the de…nitions of education and occupation
in the linked EPA survey.22. We have estimated our data in the introduction and in the
section data and calibration at following. We have divided as below between high and low
skilled categories the education and the occupation. Then, we have observed the state of
worker in the period and her situation by education and by occupation to estimate the
percentages of labour market (i.e. Nhh = a worker who is highly-educated and is employed
in a highly-skilled category). To estimate probabilities we have observed an unemployed
worker with her education in a period and we estimated what the probability would be
that the same worker take a high or low skilled job in the next period. Data are estimated
by quarters from 1988 to 1996.
De…nitions:
² We use 5 groups of education:
1. Illiterate and uneducated persons.
2. Primary education.
3. Low-secondary education.
4. Upper-secondary education.
5. Superior.
22For estimations of proportions and probabilities we have used the SAS (Statitical Analysis System)
program.
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Highly–skilled individuals are de…ned, for our purpose, as those with a level of edu-
cation greater of equal to upper-secondary education. Therefore, low–skilled individuals
essentially consist of illiterate and uneducated persons, primary or low–secondary edu-
cated people.
² We use 10 groups of occupation (range 0–9 in EPA and INEM classi…cation):
1.Business and civil service management.
1. 2.Technicians and scienti…cs and intellectual professionals.
3.Technicians and support professionals.
4.Clerical employees.
5.Workers in restaurant, catering, personal and security.
6.Skilled agricultural and …shing workers.
7.Artesans and skilled manufacturing, construction and mining (Craft-Trade work-
ers).
8.Facilities and machine operators, …tters (Plant-Machine Operators).
9.Unskilled workers.
10.Armed Forces.
Highly–skilled occupations are taken to be managers, professionals, technicians and
support professionals (range 1–3 in EPA classi…cation), the rest (range 0,4–9 in EPA)
are armed forces, clerks, service, skilled agriculturaln…shing, Craft-Transport, Plant-
Manufacture and unskilled group) is taken to de…ne low–skilled occupations.
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